Fliegende Computer

Sascha Uhrig, Airbus Central Research & Technology

Juli 2020

AIRBUS

A commercial aircraft manufacturer, **with Defence and Space as well as Helicopters Divisions**

Airbus is the largest aeronautics and space company in Europe and a worldwide leader.

Hersteller von Verkehrsflugzeugen mit zwei Divisionen

Airbus Defence and Space und Airbus Helicopters

134.931
Mitarbeiter

€ 471 Milliarden
Auftragsbestand

€ 70,5 Milliarden
Jahresumsatz, angepasst gemäß IFRS 15

AIRBUS

Global company



134,931 employees
from 142 nationalities

Located across **35** countries
on more than 180 sites

31% Europe
69% Non-Europe
International Sales

AIRBUS

Vielseitig und zukunftsweisend: die Airbus-Flugzeugfamilien

Single-aisle Family

A321neo

A320neo

A319neo

A220-300

A220-100

Widebody Family

A350-1000

A350-900

A330-900

A330-800

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Civil range

Intermediate Single

H125

H130

Light Twin

H135

H145

Medium

H155

H160

Super Medium

H175

Medium Heavy

H215

H225

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Military range

Light

H125M

H135M

H145M

Medium

AS565 MBe

H160M

Heavy

H215M

H225M

Specialised

Tiger

NH90

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Technology demonstrators

VSR700

Racer

CityAirbus

Airbus is Europe's largest and most innovative defence and space company

We develop and manufacture world-class aerospace products. Our exceptional platforms and services allow our customers to address even their most challenging operational needs.

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Strong, innovative and customer focused – Our portfolio

Military Aircraft

- A400M
- A330 Multi-Role Tanker Transport
- Special Mission Aircraft
- Combat Aircraft
- Full In-Service Support

Space Systems

- Telecommunication Satellites
- Earth Observation Satellites
- Navigation Satellites
- Orbital and Space Exploration Infrastructure
- Science Missions
- ArianeGroup (Launchers)

Communications, Intelligence and Security

- Intelligence
- CyberSecurity
- Security Solutions
- Secure Communications
- Secure Land Communications
- Future Applications

Unmanned Aerial Systems

- UAS and UAV solutions for airborne intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, and combat missions

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ACJ – Your world above the world

Airbus Corporate Jet

Erstklassig
und entspannt reisen

200+
In Betrieb

AIRBUS

Inkrementelle Innovation

Neue Produktlinien oder NEO-Versionen

Demonstrator-basierte Forschung, 3,2 Mrd. € eigenfinanzierte F&E im Jahr 2018

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Wegbereiter neuer Technologien

Nachhaltigkeit

Autonomie

Elektrifizierung

Konnektivität

Fortschrittliche Werkstoffe

Künstliche Intelligenz

Industrielle Systeme

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Airbus Research & Technology Landscape



CR&T Organisation

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CR&T [XR]

Data Science [XRD]

Main Focus
Investigate, develop & apply AI & big data improve efficiency & automate decisions

Materials [XRX]

Main Focus
Develop and study high performance materials & related manufacturing & maintenance techniques

Communication Technologies [XRC]

Main Focus
Research emerging technologies on airborne & space-borne communications

Electrics Expertise [XRE]

Main Focus
Enable the future of electric flight by pushing the limits of technology & mastering integration

Virtual Product Engineering [XRV]

Main Focus
Increase integration, digitalization and openness of engineering & manufacturing

Airbus Blue Sky [XRB]

Main Focus
Foster fundamental & speculative research in selected areas that could impact future research

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Airbus CRT

Communication Technologies

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Fly-by-Wire-Steuerung

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General: ATA Chapters

	Group: Air vehicle, engines and equipment
20	Standard practices, Airframe systems
21	Environmental control
22	Auto flight
23	Communications
24	Electrical power
25	Equipment/furnishings
26	Fire protection
27	Flight controls
28	Fuel
29	Hydraulic power
30	Ice and rain protection
31	Indicating/recording systems
32	Landing gear
33	Lights
34	Navigation
35	Oxygen
36	Pneumatic
37	Vacuum
38	Water/waste

ATA = Air Transportation Association

…99 chapters

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Avionics Bay

Avionics Bay A350



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Certification…

- ...starts at the very first step of development by contacting certification authority (CA, e.g. EASA, FAA):
  I plan development of a new A/C
- CA:
  Ok, how do you plan to make sure it is safe?
- Avionic industry:
  I am applying standards A, B, C as part of good engineering practice (= certification plan)
- CA:
  Please start doing so, we will have regular reviews…

Certification plan and applied standards are mainly frozen at start of development!

Design Assurance Level (DAL)

- Level of design assurance ☺
- Means to what extend and what kind of “quality management” is used
  (“QM” is misleading since ordinary QM is on the lower end of DAL)
- DAL is assigned to every *item* before it is developed
- DAL assignment is a very complex process based on
  - A/C functions
  - Function criticality
  - A/C architecture
- DAL defines how an item is developed (and maintained)

Software Development

- Software development in avionics is mainly based on DO-178 (ED 12)
  - Targeting requirements engineering, development process, life cycle, configuration management etc.

SOFTWARE CONSIDERATIONS IN AIRBORNE SYSTEMS AND EQUIPMENT CERTIFICATION

- Use of tools is based on ED 215
  - Rational: software development only valid if tools are of high quality

SOFTWARE TOOL QUALIFICATION CONSIDERATIONS

Software Development

- DO-178 addresses (not complete)
  - System requirements
  - Information flow between stakeholders
  - Safety assessment
  - Architectural aspects
  - System/software life cycles process
  - Software planning and development processes
  - Software quality assurance
  - Certification and liaison process

Software Testing - Examples

- Incorrect interrupt handling.
- Failure to satisfy execution time requirements.
- Incorrect software response to hardware transients or hardware failures, for example, start-up sequencing, transient input loads, and input power transients.
- Data bus and other resource contention problems, for example, memory mapping.
- Inability of built-in test to detect failures.
- Errors in hardware/software interfaces.
- Incorrect behavior of control loops.
- Incorrect control of memory management hardware or other hardware devices under software control.
- Stack overflow.
- Incorrect operation of mechanism(s) used to confirm the correctness and compatibility of field-loadable software.
- Violations of software partitioning.

- Incorrect initialization of variables and constants.
- Parameter passing errors.
- Data corruption, especially global data.
- Inadequate end-to-end numerical resolution.
- Incorrect sequencing of events and operations.
- Failure of an algorithm to satisfy a software requirement.
- Incorrect loop operations.
- Incorrect logic decisions.
- Failure to process correctly legitimate combinations of input conditions.
- Incorrect responses to missing or corrupted input data.
- Incorrect handling of exceptions, such as arithmetic faults or violations of array limits.
- Incorrect computation sequence.
- Inadequate algorithm precision, accuracy, or performance.

Special Challenge on Multicores

- DO-178 describes how to develop software and which steps to go for sufficient quality
- Multicores are seen as completely different (more complex) systems than single-cores.
  - ➔There is no official statement/*advice* how to deal with multicores
  - ➔There are no multicore systems available, yet
  - ➔There are no experiences…
- Multicore systems are not covered by any standard (so far)!
- “inofficial” guideline given in CAST32a position paper
  - ➔Parallel software explicitly **excluded**

Special Challenge on Multicores

- DO-178 descri… for sufficient…
- Multicores… …ns than single…
  - ➔There is …es
  - ➔There… mul…
  - ➔There are no experiences…
- Multicore systems are not covered by any standard (so far)!
- “inofficial” guideline given in CAST32a position paper
  - ➔Parallel software explicitly **excluded**

No experiences…not really true:

There is a single (non-Airbus) Dualcore flying...
by accident

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Some Remarks

- Certification is not a burden
- Standards are useful
  - Not directly provided by Certification Authorities
  - Developed by industrial consortia (incl. Airbus)
  - Guide to useful and acknowledged actions

EMC² Research Project

- Addresses the *famous* multicore interference problem
- Dream:
  Take a legacy single-core application and run it on a multicore
- Challenge:
  Does not work – interferences destroy any timing analysis
- Approach:
  Let someone monitor execution progress

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Single-Core & Multi-Core





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Basic Idea

- WCET approach



- Progress measurement during runtime



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Application Fingerprint

- Performance counters in every processor core
- Application fingerprint:
  the recorded amount of events per second over the execution of the application
- Unique per application



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Application Fingerprint

- Performance counters in every processor core
- Application fingerprint:
  the recorded amount of events per second over the execution of the application
- Unique per application
- Similar but stretched and scaled curve when app is slowed-down



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Basic Idea

Setup



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Basic Idea
At Development Time



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Basic Idea
During Productive Execution



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Basic Idea
During Productive Execution



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Helicopter Terrain Awareness and Warning System (HTAWS)

- Pilot support system
- Design Assurance Level: C
- Single core application
- Scheduled tasks within time space partitions



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How?

Reduce Interference from other Cores



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Control Measure: Frequency Scaling

Measurements of main/critical core



Max. allowed slow-down: 4%

Control of other cores



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Control Measure: Threshold



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Control Measure: PWM





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COEMS Research Project

- How to observe multicore behavior for longer periods?
- Dream:
  An instance checking if there are
  - any timing violations or “close to be violations”
  - any critical races
- Challenge:
  Does not work – only offline analysis possible, trace data from multicores too extensive
- Approach:
  Let evaluate behavior directly during execution

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Dream, Idea



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Demo: Ball Balancing System



COEMS multicore observer

Ball



Camera

USB hub

3-leg tilting platform

Zynq MPSoc with dualcore ARM

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Related Timings



Relationship between ball coordinates and execution time:
Ball not in centre → lifted ball
→ larger ball → longer execution time





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Academic contribution…

(not complete!)

- Certification targets the complete system
  - Including all layers
  - Must be done by system integrator (= Airbus)

- Why not starting from scratch?
  - Address the **root cause**
  - Forget about modern cores
  - Forget about traditional multicores

  - **Invent something new! Less complex, more useful (for us)**



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Many thanks…

Discussion!

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